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1. Introduction 
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Universitiit Frankfurt/Main 
Traditionally, resultative so is assumed to be a degree word. It has practically the 
same distribution as other degree operators, e.g. excessive too, equative as, and the 
degree question word how. Most strikingly, so can combine with gradable adjec­
tives like intelligent but not with non-gradable adjectives like apparent. 
( 1 )  a. so/too/as/how intelligent 
b. *so/*too/*as/*how apparent 
Therefore, result clause constructions are comparative in nature. Consider the sen­
tence in (2) . 
(2) Martha is so tall that she can reach the t�p shelf. 
In this sentence we compare Martha's tallness with some degree determined by the 
complement clause. The complement clause introduces an acceptability criterion 
for the tallness of Martha, in this case the height of the shelf in question. 
It is, however, not clear, what is the exact role of so in the semantics of result 
clauses and, in particular, in what way determines the that-clause the acceptability 
criterion. 
The picture gets more complicated if we consider result clause constructions 
with more than one so-phrase. I am going to call these constructions with Chomsky 
( 198 1 )  split-antecedent constructions. Consider the sentence in (3). 
(3) So many girls brought so many boys to the party that the room couldn't hold 
them all. 
. 
How could we capture the meaning of such a construction? Intuitively, the number 
of girls that brought boys and the number of boys that brought girls are compared 
to some acceptability criterion that is determined by the that-clause. 
This paraphrase leaves it open at first sight whether we have only one com­
parison, i .e. a comparison between the sum of the number of boys and girls and a 
standard of comparison, in this case the capacity of the room, or whether we have 
two comparions, i .e . one comparison where we compare the number of girls to an 
acceptability criterion and another comparison where we compare the number of 
boys to a possibly different acceptability criterion. 
In this paper, I am going to argue that the second view is the correct one. A 
result clause contains as many comparisons as there are so 's. And, I will show that 
this view allows us to analyse split-antecedent constructions strictly compositional. 
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In the literature, there are not too many and only incomplete proposals on 
how to analyse result clauses. And most authors concentrate on syntactic (LF) 
characteristics of constructions with a single so-phrase. 1 
Liberman ( 1 974: 87), e.g., proposes that, in split-antecedent constructions, 
every surface occurrence of so is interpreted by a degree variable. A (presum­
ably invisible) semaritic degree operator so relates two propositions: (a) the open 
proposition expressed by the main clause and (b) the proposition expressed by the 
that-clause. He proposes an LF-structure as in (4) for the sentence given in (3) .  A 
similar LF-structure is also defended in Gueron & May ( 1 984) . 
(4) so[n-many girls brought m-many boys] [(that) the room couldn't hold them 
all] 
However, the authors do not address the questions how the operator so binds the 
variables m and n, how so is actually interpreted and how it relates to so in single­
so-constructions and other comparative constructions. 
In my dissertation, I tried to capture the meaning of result clauses with mul­
tiple heads in terms of a comparison between lists of degrees Meier 2000. A com­
parison of lists is defined as a comparison of the sum of the coordinates of each list. 
Based on this analysis, the sentence in (3) is predicted to be true in a situation if 55  
girls brought 76 boys and the room only holds a hundred people since 5 5  plus 76  
i s  more than 1 00. But this analysis faces several problems. Frist of  all, the so 's in 
split-antecedent constructions denote something different from so in a single head 
construction. The analysis is not strictly compositional. And second, the analysis 
is too simplistic . Consider the sentence in (5). 
(5) So many people liked so many pictures that the show must go on. 
Assume that the board of the exhibition agreed to prolong the exhibition if more 
than 4000 people like more than 1 50 pictures. The shows goes on if on the one 
hand 5069 people liked pictures and if on the other hand more than 1 5 1  pictures are 
liked by people. In this case we intuitively have two comparisons one for people 
and one for pictures. Summing up pictures and people would not make any sense. 
In this paper, I will make the following claims : First, result clause con­
structions are best captured by an extraposition analysis. This claim is and remains 
controversial. To my knowledge, there is no theory yet that can capture all syntac­
tic peculiarities of result clause constructions, but a version of a movement theory 
as proposed by Gereon Muller and Wolfgang Stemefeld in 1 993 and elaborated in 
Muller ( 1 995) predicts most of the critical syntactic features. In this respect, I am 
following the footsteps of Bresnan ( 1 973), Gueron & May ( 1 984) etc. who also 
proposed an analysis in terms of extraposition. 
Furthermore, resultative so is claimed to be a degree quantifier that operates 
on the meaning of the main clause and the meaning of the that-clause. Under the 
assumption that so has quantificational character, we are able to predict scope am­
biguities in intensional contexts for example . Here I am following Heim (2000) . 
The fact that there are scope ambiguities in constructions with resultative so and 
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intensional operators is an additional argument against Kennedy's ( 1 997) approach 
to adjectival semantics. 
The third claim concerns the reconstruction of a suitable standard of com­
parison on the basis of the that-clause. I will argue that the that-clause in fact 
hides a conditional clause. The antecedent of this conditional is a copy of the main 
clause. And, the proposition expressed by the that-clause supplies the consequent. 
This assumption is already defended for German result clauses in Meier (2000) . In 
particular, I am going to argue for a syntactic copying rule and against a duplication 
process triggered by the semantics of so. In this respect, I am arguing against my 
own analysis in Meier (2000) and against the approach in Heim (2000) . 
And finally, split-antecedent constructions are argued to have as many that­
clauses as there are so-phrases. Only one of those that-clauses undergoes extra­
position. The others are deleted before Spell-out. This position is similar to the 
position of Gueron & May. At the level of LF, however, all deleted that-clauses are 
recovered and play a crucial role in the interpretation. Here, my position is different 
from the position in Gueron & May. 
The paper is organized as follows: In a first step, I will briefly discuss the 
syntactic derivation of the surface structure and the Logical Form of result clauses 
with a single head. Then I will propose a semantics for so . In a second step, I 
will review some properties of result clause constructions. And in a last step, I 
am going to show how the proposed analysis applies to constructions with multiple 
so-phrases. 
2. Syntactic derivation: an extraposition analysis 
In order to derive a suitable LF, I assume that so and the that-clause form a con­
stituent that is usually named degree phrase, and that the degree phrase is base­
generated in the complement position to the adjective. Here, I am following the 
tracks of von Stechow ( 1 993) and most recently Heim (2000) . The sentence in (2) 
starts its life with the structure in (6-a) . Now consider the structure in (6-b). This 
configuration represents the sentence in its surface structure. Extraposition brings 
the that-clause in sentence final position. Following Muller & Sternefeld ( 1 993), I 
assume that extraposition is successive cyclic adjunction to the right. This move­
ment satisfies the so-called Principle of Unambiguous Binding (PUB)? 
(6) a. [cp Martha is [AP [DegP so [cp that she can reach for the top shelf]] tall]] 
b. Extraposition of the that-clause 
[cp Martha is [AP [AP [ [DegP so til til tall] td . . .  [cP that she can reach for 
the top shelf]d 
With this approach we also predict apparent violations of the Complex NP con­
straint: see Rouveret ( 1 978) for extensive discussion. 
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2. 1 .  The Complex NP Constraint 
It seems not to matter how deeply the so phrase is embedded within a sentence. In 
(7) the that-clause successively crosses an AP, an NP, a PP and another NP by right 
adjunction. 
(7) [NP [NP Plots [pp [pp by [NP [NP [AP [AP [[DegP so til til many] til conspirators] 
!i]] !ill !i] have been hatched [cp that the government has jailed them]i .  
The extraposition account in terms of  cyclic adjunction of  the that-clause i s  however 
problematic. 
2.2. Clause boundedness of extra position 
In some cases, it is not possible to cross a clause boundary with the that-clause by 
extraposition. (8-a), for example, is a possible surface structure. (8-b) with long 
extraposition of the that-clause is ungrammatica1.3 
(8) Long extra position is NOT possible 
a. [NP The secret plans [cp that so tl many people know about [cp that the 
police has lost all credibility hll have finally been hatched 
b. * [NP The secret plans [cp that so tl many people know about]] have fi­
nally been hatched [cp that the police has lost all credibilityh 
In other cases, however, extraposition is obviously not clause bound. Compare the 
sentence in (9) . If the relative clause is adjoined to a bare noun, extraposition of the 
that-clause across a clause boundary seems to be possible. The last CP containing 
the result clause crosses the clause boundary of the relative clause. 
(9) Long extra position IS possible 
[NP Criticsi [cp who have reviewed so tl many booksll were at the party [cp 
that I didn't have time to speak to themi allh 
Following Muller & Stemefeld we do not have an explanation for (9) . These authors 
stipulate that cyclic right adjunction to CP is not an option. This stipulation is 
necessary in order to explain the clause boundedness of extraposition, in general, 
and correctly rules out the configuration in (8-b). 
In my opinion, the examples show that the extraposition theory is not yet 
perfect. But we do not have enough evidence, up to date, that it is false.4 
3. Semantic derivation: a degree analysis 
Now, let me try to determine what a result clause with a single so-phrase means. 
In my intuition, the sentence in (2), repeated here in ( 10), introduces first Martha's 
actual height on a scale. 
. . . 
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( 1 0) Martha is so tall that she can reach the top shelf. 
The that-clause introduces possible values for Martha's height such that if she has 
these values she can reach the top shelf. In order to understand this, we have to 
assume counterfactually that Martha has a different height from her actual height. 
Finally, the minimum of these possible values is compared to the actual height 
of Martha. The that-clause therefore determines a critical lower bound of possible 
values. In fact, Martha's actual height has to be at least as high as some hypothetical 
height that is sufficient to reach the top shelf. 
In terms of definite descriptions, I propose to paraphrase the meaning of (2) 
as in ( 1 1 ) .  
( 1 1 )  "The degree d such that Martha i s  tall to .d (in the actual world) is greater 
than (or equal to) the minimal degree d* such that: if Martha is d* -tall, she 
can reach the top shelf." 
The main characteristics of the paraphrase are the following: The result clause 
construction seems to hide a conditional that is based on information of the main 
clause and on information of the that-clause. Furthermore, the information of the 
main clause appears twice in the paraphrase : once in front of the greater-than-or­
equal relation and once as a part of the if-clause. If we want to derive this fact 
compositionally, we have to propose some kind of duplication rule that targets the 
main clause. 
In my dissertation (Meier 2000), I propose a semantic rule to duplicate the 
main clause information, as in ( 1 2) .  The that-clause, I assumed to be an incomplete 
conditional, i .e . , a sentence that lacks an if-clause. And so is a function that com­
bines the incomplete conditional (represented by Q) and the main clause. The main 
clause information (represented by P) entered the truth conditions twice, once in 
order to make the incomplete conditional complete and once to provide the object 
value in the actual world. 
( 1 2) The meaning of so (with semantic duplication, Meier 2000) 
[so] = f : D<s ,« s ,<p,t» ,« d,p> ,t» > 
For any world w E W, any degree predicate P E D<d,p> and any that­
clause Q E D<s,<p,t» : 
f(w) (Q ) (P)  = 1 iff 
MAX{d : P(d) (w) )  = I }  � MIN{d* : Q (w) (P(d* ) ) )  = I } 
In this paper, I am going to propose a syntactic rule of duplication and different 
truth conditions for so, instead, as in ( 1 3) .  The reason for this move is the analysis 
of split-antecedent constructions that I will present below. I think that a uniform 
analysis of single so and multiple so constructions necessitates a syntactic rule of 
duplication. 
Basically, the syntactic copying rule copies the main clause, replaces the 
trace in the copy by an empty category that is indexed with the same index as the 
trace and inserts the copy in the that-clause as if it were an if-clause to the sentence 
RESULT CLAUSES 
in the that-clause. The insertion operation, I assume to be IP-adjunction. 
( 1 3) Duplication rule (first version;:.<----_______ ..., 
[ [OegP so [cp that . . .  [vp . . .  ]]]j [cp . . .  [AP tj adjective]] ] :::} 
[[OegP so [cp that [IP I [cp (if) . . .  [AP tj adjective]] I [vp . . .  ] ] ]L 
I [cp . . .  [AP tj adjective]] I ] 
Note that the duplication rule is applied after reconstruction of the that-clause to 
its base-generated position and after movement of the whole degree phrase to a 
sentence initial position. ( 14-a) is the surface configuration of our sentence in ( 1 0) .  
( 14-b) i s  the LF-representation that feeds the duplication rule. 
( 14) a. [cp Martha is [AP [AP [[OegP so td td tall] til . . .  [cp that she can reach 
the top shelt];] 
b. [ [OegP so [cp that she can reach the top shelt]]j [cp Martha is [AP tj 
tall]]] 
If we apply the duplication rule to this example we derive the Logical Form in 
( 1 5-b). At LF so relates the that-clause in form of an ordinary conditional if Martha 
is e-tall she can reach for the top shelf and the main clause Martha is t-tall. 
( 1 5) a. [ [OegP so [cp that [vp she can reach the top shelt]]]]j 
[cp Martha is [AP tj tall]] :::} 
b. [ [DegP so [cp that [ IP [cp (if) Martha is [AP ej tall]] [vp she can reach 
the top shelfJ]]]j I [cp Martha is [AP tj tall]] P 
This is the structure that feeds the interpretation. 
Adjectives denote functions of type < s , < d, < e , i > > > in the intensional 
framwork that I am using. tall for example is true for a world, a specific degree d 
and an individual if the individual is tall to degree d, as in ( 1 6) .  
( 1 6) [tall] = f : D < s , < d, < e , i » > 
For any world w E  W, degree d E Dd and individuals a E De : 
f (w ) (d) (a ) = 1 
iff a is tall to degree d in w. 
The trace of the DegP movement and the empty category e are interpreted as degree 
variables. And these variables are bound by a version of a predicate abstraction. 
The movement index j of the degree phrase in ( 1 5-b) triggers A-abstraction over 
the degree variable of the main clause. At the level of that a A-abstract of the 
conditional is created, abstracting away over the degree variable of the if-clause. 
For the comparative morpheme so, I propose the meaning in ( 1 7) .  The 
general idea is that so relates two degree predicates :  a degree predicate (Q) denoted 
by the (enriched) that-clause and a degree predicate (P) denoted by the main clause. 
So maximizes the degree predicate denoted by the main clause and it minimizes 
the degree predicate denoted by the that-clause and it introduces the comparison 
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relation. More specifically, the result clause construction is true if the maximal 
degree that satisfies the main clause in the world of utterance is greater or equal to 
the minimal degree that satisfies the proposition expressed by the that-clause. 
( 1 7) The meaning of so (with syntactic duplication) 
[so] = f :  D < s , « d, p > , « d, p > , t » > 
For any world w E W, and any degree predicates P, Q E D<d,p> : 
f(w) (Q ) (P) = 1 iff 
MAX{d : P(d) (w) = I } � MIN{d* : Q (d* ) (w) = I } 
Maximality and minimality are defined standardly as in ( 1 8) .  
( 1 8) a. MAX(P)  = td.P(d) = l&\ld' [P(d' )  = 1 =? d' � d] 
b. MIN(P) = td.P(d) = l&\ld' [P(d' )  = 1 =? d � d'] 
On the semantics specified so far, ( 1 5-b) gets the truth conditions in ( 1 9) ,  where 9 
is any variable assignment and Wo is a designated variable for the actual world. 
( 1 9) MAX {d :Martha is d-tall in g( wo)} � 
MIN {d* : if Martha is d* -tall, she can in g( wo) reach the top shelf} 
The maximal degree d, such that Martha is d-tall in the actual world is at least 
as great as the minimal degree d* such that if Martha is d* -tall, she can reach the 
top shelf. Let me disregard for the moment that the actual height of Martha is 
maximalized. Ifwe compare the truth conditions in ( 1 9) with our original intuitively 
motivated paraphrase in ( 1 1) ,  we observe that they are identical. Thus, the analysis 
seems to work fine so far. 
4. Three arguments in favor of the analysis 
In the following, I am going to present three arguments in favor of this analysis. 
4. 1 .  Binding phenomena 
Binding phenomena show that an extraposition analysis is preferred for result clause 
constructions over a base generation analysis. I am following in this respect basi­
cally the argumentation by Biiring & Hartmann ( 1 995) with respect to PP-depen­
dent clauses in German, for example. The relevant facts for result clauses are pre­
sented in (20) . In (20-a) a subject quantifier binds a pronoun in a that-clause that is 
associated with the predicative AP. This configuration appears to be well-formed. 
In (20-b), however, an object quantifier binds a pronoun that is associated with the 
AP contained in the subject phrase.  Such a configuration is not possible. 
(20) a. Every tennis player; was training so intensely that she; sooner or later 
got injured. . 
RESULT CLAUSES 
b. *So many people donated money to every radio stationi that i� met itsi 
year-end goals (in raising money) . 
For the grammatical case (20-a), I assume that the so-phrase has narrow scope 
with respect to the quantifier at the level of LF. The quantifier is therefore in a 
c-command position and can bind the pronoun she, as in (2 1 -a) . In the ungrammat­
ical case (20-b), the so-phrase has wide scope with respect to the object quantifier. 
The object quantifier is therefore not in a position to bind the pronoun at the level 
of LF, as in (2 1 -b).5 
(2 1 )  a. [cp [NP every tennis playerih [cp [OegP so that shei . . .  ]2 t1 was training 
h intensely]] 
b. * [cp [OegP so that i� . . .  ] 2  [cp [NP t2 many peopleh [cP [NP every radio 
stationd1 h donated to tt l]] 
An analysis that base-generates the that-clause in the right periphery ofthe sentence 
may not predict these subject-object asymmetries in a straight forward way. 
4.2. Explicit/implicit modalization 
Kratzer ( 1 978) argues that unmodalized conditionals are in fact modalized implic­
itly by a modal with universal force.  And she shows that it is possible to add a modal 
denoting necessity to unmodalized conditionals without changing the meaning of 
the construction. 
The same seems to hold for constructions with result clauses. Consider 
the example in (22). We can add a phrase like it was necessary to the that-clause 
without changing the truth conditions of the construction. (22-a) and (22-b) are 
identical in meaning. 
(22) a. She was so hot that she fainted. 
b. She was so hot that it was necessary that she fainted. 
This means that we have an argument by analogy for the existence of a conditional 
in result clause constructions. However, it is not possible to make the implicit 
conditional explicit. 
4 .3 . Scope interaction 
Truth conditional ambiguities corroborate the analysis of so as a quantifier.6 If 
the so-phrase occurs in the c-command domain of other operators at the surface 
structure we may observe usually more than one reading of the sentence. Consider, 
for example the sentence (23) .  
This sentence may either imply that the reason for us not to invite Bill for 
dinner is a claim by Mary. This is (23-a). Or the sentence can mean that Mary 
claimed a proposition in form of a result clause. (23-b) is compatible with the fact 
that we invited Bill for dinner, but (23-a) is not. 
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Mary claimed that Bill was so weird that we didn't invite him to dinner. 
a. "We didn't invite Bill to dinner because Mary claimed that Bill was 
weird." 
b. "Mary claimed that we didn't invite Bill to dinner because he was 
weird." 
In order to derive this ambiguity, I propose the following LF configurations. In 
(24-a) the so-phrase has scope over the intensional operator claim and in (24-b) 
claim outscopes the so-phrase. 
(24) a. [ [DegP so [cp that [vp we didn't invite him to dinner]]]j [cp Mary 
claimed that Bill was [AP tj weird]]]  
b. [cp Mary claimed that Bill was [DegP so [cp that [vp we didn't invite 
him to dinner]]]j [cp [AP tj weird]]]  
These LFs get the interpretation in (2S) . In one reading (23) means (2S-a) : the 
maximal degree d such that Mary claimed Bill was weird to degree d is at least as 
great as the minimal degree d* such that if Mary claimed that Bill was weird to 
degree d* , we don't invite him for dinner. In the other reading (23) means (2S-b): 
Mary claimed that Bill 's weirdness is at least as great as the minimal d* such that if 
Bill was d* -weird we don't invite him for dinner. 
(2S) a. AI AX {d : M. claimed that Bill was d-weird} 2': 
AI I N {d* : if M. claimed that Bill was d* -weird, we don't invite him 
for dinner} 
b. Mary claimed that AI AX {d : Bill was d-weird} 2': 
AI I N {d* : if Bill was d*-weird, we don't invite him for dinner} 
5. Result clauses with multiple heads 
In the next step, I am going to show that this system is applicable to result clause 
constructions with split antecedents and that the predictions we derive from the 
analysis meet our intuitions about the meaning of such sentences. Let us consider 
our old sentence (S) repeated in (26) . 
(26) So many people like so many pictures that the show must go on. 
Intuitively, the fact that the show must go on, depends on how many people liked 
how many pictures. Disregard the impact of the standard of comparison for a mo­
ment. If we do that, (26) means something like (27). I call this the big picture. 
Assume that the value for the standard of comparison for the set of people is d* 
and the value for the standard of comparison for the set of pictures is e* . And as­
sume that the set of people and the set of pictures is not empty. Then (26) may be 
paraphrased by (27) . That is, the big picture is a conjunction of two comparisons. 
(27) The big picture 
RESULT CLAUSES 
The cardinality of people that like pictures is at least as great as d* AND 
the cardinality of pictures that are liked by people is at least as great as e* . 
How do we determine the standards of comparison d* and e*? It should be obvious 
what my proposal is going to be. The standards are determined by some implicit 
conditional that gives us a set of cardinalities. The cardinality of the set of people 
has to be at least as great as the minimal number d that satisfies the conditional if 
d-many people like pictures the show must go on, as in (28-a). And the cardinality 
of the set of pictures has to be at least as great as the minimal number e such that if 
e-many pictures are liked by people the show must go on, as in (28-b) . 
(28) a. d* = the minimal d such that: if d-many people like pictures, the show 
must go on 
b. e*= the minimal e such that: if e-many pictures are liked by people, 
the show must go on 
What are the characteristics of this paraphrase if we put (27) and (28) together? 
The first observation is that we have to take into account a certain paral­
lelism. Consider the first conjunct in the big picture (27) . The standard of compar­
ison for the cardinality of the set of people is d* in (28-a) and d* is a cardinality 
of people, too. In other words, we compare the actual cardinality to a minimally 
sufficient cardinality of people. Hypothetical cardinalities of pictures seem to be 
irrelevant for the determination of the critical lower bound for people. The same 
structure can be found in the second conjunct in (27). Ifwe compare the actual car­
dinality of pictures to some hypothetical minimum of pictures - this is e* in (28-b) 
- the hypothetical number of people is irrelevant. 
I am going to capture this parallelism by a process of existential closure at 
the level of the that-clause. 
The second observation is: The information of the main clause appears sev­
eral times. Twice in the big picture (27) and once in each conditional . It is obvious 
that this multiplication of the main clause information might be handled by some 
variant of the syntactic duplication rule, I proposed above. 
And the third observation is: the information of the that-clause the show 
must go on appears twice, once as a consequent of the standard of comparison d* 
in (28-a) and once as a consequent of the standard of comparison e* in (28-b). I am 
assuming that both instances of the that-clause are actually there. 
In order to derive the surface structure of (26), I am assuming that one that­
clause is extraposed to a sentence final position and one that-clause is deleted under 
identity. This is shown in (29) . 
(29) a. [cP [AP [OegP so [cp that the show must go on]] many] people like [AP 
[OegP so [cp that the show must go on]] many] pictures] 
b. [cp [cp [AP [DegP so [cp that the show must go on] ] many] people like 
[AP [OegP so ti ] many] pictures] [cp that the show must go on]i] 
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More generally speaking, I assume that split-antecedent constructions contain as 
many that-clauses as there are so-phrases. Evidence for the fact that this is correct 
is given in (30) . It is possible to have split-antecedent constuctions with more than 
one that-clause at surface structure. One that-clause may appear sentence internally. 
Paulien Rijkoek makes a similar claim in her dissertation. She even claims that two 
that-clauses can occur in sentence final position.7 
(30) a. So many lectures that we had no time to attend them all have been 
given by such boring professors that we didn't WANT to attend them 
all. 
b. So many people have so much money that they do not know what to 
do with it, that charity institutions would go bankrupt on the stamps 
needed to reach them all. 
For the derivation of the LF, all deleted that-clauses are recovered and the extra­
posed that-clause is reconstructed to its base position. In (3 1 )  the degree phrases 
are raised to CP leaving the traces tt and t2 • This movement is an instance of 
quantifier raising and is type-driven. 
(3 1 )  [cP [OegP s o  [cp that the show must go on]h [cp [OegP s o  [cp that the show 
must go on]h [cp [NP [AP tt many] people]] like [NP [AP t2 many] pic­
tures]]]] 
This is the moment where the multiplication rule comes into play that targets the 
main clause information. According to this rule we copy the main clause as many 
times as there are so-phrases in the syntax. As in the case with single so the traces 
of the degree phrases are replaced by empty categories, the indices of the traces are 
copied. Then each copy is inserted as an if-clause to the propositions expressed by 
the that-clause. 
(32) Multiplication rule (revised version for n-many so-phrases) 
a. [cp [OegP so [cp that . . .  [vp . . . ] ] ]0 . . . [cp [OegP so [cp that . .  . 
[vp . . .  ]]]n [cp . . . [ AP to adjective] . . .  [AP tn adjective] . . .  ] ] ::} 
b. [cp [OegP so [cp that [cp (it) . . . [AP eo adj .] . . .  [AP en adj .] . . .  ]
[VP . . .  ]]]0 
[cp [OegP so [cp that I [cp (it) . . .  [AP eo adj .] . . . [AP en adj .] . . .  ] I 
• • •  [ VP • • •  ]]]n I [cp . . .  [AP to adj .] . . . [AP tn adj .] ]  P] 
Let us now apply the multiplication rule to our example in (26) . Multiplication in 
this case is triplication, as in (33) .  Both if-clauses are exact copies of each other. 
Both conditionals are assumed to determine a standard of comparison. 
(33) [cp [OegPI so [cp that [ Ip 
[cp (it) [NP [AP et many] people]] like [NP [AP e2 many] pict.]]] 
RESULT CLAUSES 
[CP [DegP2 SO [cp that [ IP 
[cp (if) [NP [AP el many] people]] like [NP [AP e2 many] pict.]]] 
How then is it possible to capture the parallelism, we just discovered a minute ago. 
Remember that the actual cardinality of people was compared in the paraphrase to 
some minimally possible hypothetical cardinality of people. The cardinality of the 
pictures was irrelevant to determine the standard of comparison. And the actual 
cardinality of the pictures was compared to some minimally possible hypothetical 
cardinality of pictures. In the second case the cardinality of people was irrelevant in 
order to determine the standard of comparison intuitively. Or in other words : The 
first conditional in (33) is supposed to determine a set of cardinalities of people and 
the second conditional is supposed to determine a set of cardinalities of pictures. 
In order to capture this observation, I propose that one lambda operator is 
introduced at each level of that and this lambda operator only binds that degree 
variable that has the same index as the movement index of the so-phrase that heads 
the conditional. The remaining degree variables get bound by existential closure at 
the level of that. 
In order to see the effect of existential closure and lambda abstraction, I will 
focus in the next step on the representation of the DegPl of (26) . Consider the tree 
in (34) . 
(34) 
DegP I «d.<s.t».t> 
'�@)�" W3':=ST(W�)�:�" h.w ':
�
. m\�W.d'_�" ,w," I� ,--mm, ,"m� I. W�)) 
Deg CP<d.<s.t» 
w(@) ,.·,w"O.(MUST(w)(hX'w'.", ,h.w ,H' •• In \d._m .. , ,..,1. Illre .. -m .. , pict •• " In w�l 
C � 
A.d*��3e'. MUST(w)(h)(Aw'.the show goes on in w')(Aw'.d*-many people like e' -many pictures in w') 
r_�
-· ·-·
·S\ 
AW' el many people like e2 many pictures 
d*-many people like e'-many pictures in w' 
��,,�'-VP 
MUST(w)(h)(AW'.the show goes on in w') 
� 
V VP 
�P A� V h � 
V <S.<h.<P� !h:'st�w V must w the show /'--., MUST V I go on w 
go on 
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At the level of that, A-abstraction applies to the degree variable that is indexed with 
the same index as the movement index of the degree phrase. The remaining free 
degree variable is existentially bound. The that-clause in the first DegP therefore 
denotes a set of cardinalities that the subject of the if-clause people has, as desired. 
The other degree phrase DegP2 is interpreted analogously. The that-clause in the 
second degree phrase denotes a set of cardinalities that the object of the if-clause 
pictures has. DegP 1 and DegP2 only differ with respect to the movement indices 
that trigger A-abstraction. 
If we apply our semantic rules to the whole structure in (33), they assign 
the truth conditions in (35) .  The first line is a version of the big picture in (27) . 
The standard of comparisons are minimal cardinalities that satisfy an existential 
statement. 
(35) MAX{d : MAX{e  : d - many people like e-many pict .} � e*} � d* 
where 
d* = MIN {d* : 3e'[ if d* -many people like e'-many pictures, the show 
must go on n and 
e* = MIN{e* : 3d'[if d'-many people like e*-many pictures, the show 
must go onn 
The key characteristics of this interpretation is that one comparison is embedded 
within the first component of the other comparison. The next task is to show that 
(35) indeed means something like the paraphrase in (27) . 
In order to derive the intuitive paraphrase in form of a conjunction from 
(35), I basically exploit the fact that statements with a maximality operator may 
be translated into existential statements if we assume Russell 's theory of definite 
descriptions. Let us concentrate on the outer comparison, first. (36-a) is equiva­
lent to (35) .  By the definition of maximality (36-b) and the definition of definite 
descriptions (36-c), we reformulate the outer comparison in terms of an existential 
statement, as in (36-d). 
(36) a. MAX{d : <p(d)} � d* 
(with <p = Ar[  M AX {e  : r-many people like e-many pictures} � e* ] )  
b. l,d.<p( d) = 1 & 'v'd' [<p( d') = 1 '* d' ::; d] � d* (maximality) 
c. 3d[<p(d) = 1 & 1 <p 1 = 1 & 'v'd' [<p(d') = 1 ---+ d' ::; d] & d � d* 
(definite description) 
d. 3d[<p(d) = 1 & d is unique & d is maximal & d � d*] 
The first conjunct of the existential statement in (36-d) is true if the inner compar­
ison in (37-a) holds. By maximality and the definition for definite descriptions we 
derive the existential statement in (37-d), in analogy to the previous procedure. 
(37) a. MAX {e : d - many people like e-many pictures} � e* 
b. MAX{e : t/J (e )}  � e* 
(with t/) = Ar.d-many people like r - many pictures) 
c. l,e .t/J (e )  = 1 & 'v'e'[t/J ( e') = 1 ---+ e' ::; e] � e* (maximality) 
RESULT CLAUSES 
d. :3e [1jJ(e )  = 1 & 1 1jJ 1 = 1 & Ve' [1jJ ( e') = 1 ---t e' ::; e] & e 2 e* 
(definite description) 
e. :3e [1jJ(e )  = 1 & e is unique & e is maximal & e 2 e* 
Ifwe put (36-d) and (37-e) together, we get the existential statement in (38) .  
(38) :3d[:3e [d-many people like e-many pictures & e is unique & e is maximal 
& e 2 e*] & d is unique & d is maximal & d 2 d*] 
Every formula with a maximality operator in the truth conditions in (35) may be 
turned into a formula of predicate logic containing an existential statement. And 
one existential statement is nested into the other. But the existential quantifiers do 
not take scope with respect to each other. 
(39-b) and (39-c), respectively, follow from (39-a). A short comparison will 
reveal that (39-b) and (39-c) together are the ingredients for our intuitive paraphrase 
in (27) .8 
(39) a. :3d:3e [d is unique & d is maximal & e is unique & e is maximal 
& d-many people like e-many pictures & e 2 e* & d 2 d*] 
b. '* :3d:3e [dis unique & d is maximal & e is unique & e is maximal 
& d-many people like e-many pictures & d 2 d*] (first conjunct of 
(27» 
c. '* :3d:3e [d is unique & d is maximal & e is unique & e is maximal 
& d-many people like e-many pictures & e 2 e*] (second conjunct of 
(27» 
If we applied the same method of interpretation to the sentence in (3), repeated here 
in (40), we, however, encounter a problem. It seems that the operation of existential 
quantification does not make the correct predictions. 
(40) So many girls brought so many boys that the room couldn't hold them all. 
(4 1 )  states the truth conditions we derive with the instrumentarium so far. 
(4 1 )  MAX{d : MAX{e : d - many girls brought e-many boys} 2 e* } 2 d* 
where 
a. d* = MIN {d* : :3e' [if d* -many girls brought e'-many boys, the room 
cannot hold them all] } and 
b. e* = MIN {e* : :3d' [if d'-many girls bring e* -many boys, the room 
cannot hold them all] } 
The actual cardinality of girls that brought boys is compared to some minimally ad­
missible cardinality or
'
girls d* , and the actual cardinality of boys that were brought 
by girls is compared to some minimally admissible cardinality of boys e* .  The 
nested comparison may be reformulated as in (42) . 
(42) :3d:3e [d is unique & d is maximal & e is unique & e is maximal & d-many 
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girls brought e-many boys & e � e* & d � d*] 
Ifwe evaluate these truth conditions we predict the sentence to be true in a situation 
where 20 girls brought 70 boys and the room holds 1 00 people, contrary to our 
intuition. Why should this be the case? According to the truth conditions, the actual 
cardinality of the girls is compared to the minimal cardinality of girls such that there 
is some number of boys that the girls brought to the party and the room couldn't 
hold them. This minimum could be one girl that brought at least 1 00 boys. And 
one girl is less than 20 girls. The same argument can be made for the comparison 
of the actual cardinality of boys to some minimal cardinality of boys. It seems, 
therefore, that our method of interpretation is not capable of interpreting the mutual 
interdependence of the cardinalities of boys and girls, yet. 
In order to repair this flaw of the analysis, I propose to reconsider the calcu­
lation of the admissibility criteria d* and e* in (4 1 )  and (42). 
Intuitively, it is not just some cardinality of boys that could be brought by 
girls that is relevant for the calculation of the minimum of girls but the actual car­
dinality of boys, and it is not some cardinality of girls that brought boys that is 
relevant for the calculation of the minimum of boys but the actual cardinality of 
girls. The relevant admissibility criteria may be paraphrased as in (43), where eo 
refers to the number of boys that were actually brought by the girls to the party and 
do refers to the number of girls that actually brought the boys to the party. 
(43) a .  d* = the minimal d' such that: if d'-many girls bring eo-many boys, 
the room cannot hold them all 
b. e*= the minimal e' such that: if e'-many boys are brought by do-many 
girls, the room cannot hold them all. 
This paraphrase is plausible. If 20 girls brought 70 boys, d* is the minimal d such 
that if d-many girls bring 70 boys, the room cannot hold them all. If the room is 
limited to 1 00 people, d* is equal to 3 1  and greater than d and not at least as great. 
Therefore, the sentence in (26) is predicted to be false in such a situation, as desired. 
The minimum of girls depends on the actual number of boys and the minimum of 
boys depends on the actual number of girls. 
If 70 girls brought 20 boys, d* is the minimal d such that if d-many girls 
bring 20 boys, the room cannot hold them all . And, if the room is limited to 1 00 
people, d* is equal to 8 1  and at least as great as d. But the minimal e* such that 
if 70 girls bring e* -many boys, the room cannot hold them all, is equal to 3 1  and 
greater than the actual cardinality of boys. Again, the sentence in (26) is predicted 
to be false in such a situation, as desired. 
The crucial point of the paraphrase is: we characterize the relevant cardinal­
ity of boys and girls, respectively, by using a definite description for the reference of 
eo the number of boys that were actually brought to the party by the girls in (43-a) 
and for the reference of do the number of girls that actually brought the boys to the 
party in (43-b). 
One way to think about the variables in technichal terms is the following: 
do and eo are referential pronouns that are interpreted as simple free variables and 
RESULT CLAUSES 
get their interpretation by the utterance context. Their reference is anaphorically 
related to the maximal number of girls that brought boys and the maximal number 
of boys that are brought by girls. Since it is characteristic for E-type pronouns to 
be paraphrased by definite descriptions : see Heim & Kratzer ( 1 998) for discussion, 
the variables do and eo in (43) are also natural candidates for E-type pronouns. 
Therefore, I conclude that an interpretation of the empty categories in the 
hidden if-clause in terms of referential pronouns or E-type-pronouns makes more 
general predictions than simple existential closure at the level of that. 
In a last step, I will give a hint to why truth conditions for so that rely 
on semantic duplication of the main clause information do not make the correct 
predictions for result clauses with split antencents. I repeat in (44) the meaning 
for so with semantic duplication. Remember that so duplicates the main clause 
information. 
(44) The meaning of so (= ( 1 2) 
[so] = f : D<s,« s,<p,t» ,« d,p> ,t» > 
For any world w E W, and any degree predicate P E D<d,p> and any 
that-clause Q E D<s,<p,t» : f(w) (Q) (P)  = 1 iff 
MAX{d : P(d) (w) )  = 1 }  2: MIN{d* : Q (w) (P(d*) ) )  = I } 
In split-antecedent constructions the problem is the following: If we apply our rule 
for so to the outer sol in (45-a), the inner s02 gets duplicated. Therefore, the truth 
conditions in (45-b) host three comparisons. And this is counterintuitive. 
(45) a. [cP [OegPI so l [cp that the show must go on]] 1 [cp [OegP2 s02 [cp that 
the show must go on]h [cp [NP [AP h many] people]] like [NP [AP t2 
many] pictures]]]] 
b. MAX {d : d-many people like so many pictures that the show must 
go on} 2: MIN { d* : if d* -many people like so many pictures that the 
show must go on the show must go on} 
6. Conclusion 
The current derivation ofthe meaning of single so and split-antecedent result clause 
constructions relies on the following assumptions : ( l )  There is one that-clause as­
sociated with each occurrence of so. (2) The sentential complement of a result 
clause construction is assumed to represent a hidden conditional. (3) This hidden 
conditional is recovered syntactically and not semantically, as previously assumed. 
(4) The antecedents of the conditionals are open propositions that are identical to 
the proposition expressed by the main clause. (5) A-abstraction at the level of that 
is an index sensitive mechanism. (6) Variables inthe that-clause that carry an index 
that is identcal to the movement index of the degree phrase that dominates the that­
clause get bound by A-abstraction. (7) Remaining free variables remain free and get 
a referential interpretation provided by the context of utterance. An operation of ex­
istential closure seems not to be appropriate. The binding mechanism depends on 
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the syntactic function of the first maximal phrase that dominates the degree phrase. 
In other words, the maximal phrase that dominates a degree phrase in the main 
clause and the phrase that contains a degree variable bound by A-abstraction in the 
antecedent of a hidden conditional have the same syntactic function. These assump­
tions enable us to derive the meaning of split-antecedent result clause constructions. 
Endnotes 
* I wish to thank Roger Schwarzschild, Ede Zimmermann and the participants 
of the SALT 1 1  conference for discussion on the topics of this paper. 
1 .  The most important and influential is the article of Gueron & May ( 1 984) . 
More recent attempt to resolve the problems is Rochemont & Culicover ( 1 990) . 
2 .  Principle of Unambiguous Binding Muller & Stemefeld ( 1 993 : 46 1 ) :  A 
variable that is 0: bound must be {3-free in the domain of the head of its chain 
(where 0: and (3 refer to different types of positions) . Movement through a specifier 
postion to an A-bar-position counts as improper in this account. 
3 .  Compare the fundamental work in Rouveret ( 1 978), Gueron & May ( 1 984) 
and Rijkhoek ( 1 998). 
4. I refer the reader to the discussion on (45) in Rochemont & Culicover ( 1 990) 
and recent work by Danny Fox and Jon Nissenbaum on this topic. 
5 .  This argument presupposes that the object quantifier must not have wide 
scope with respect to the subject so-phrase at LF. See Kennedy ( 1 997) and Heim 
(2000) on further discussion on this topic. 
6 .  Ambiguities of result clauses were first discussed by Liberman ( 1 974) . 
7 .  Gueron & May ( 1 984), however, dispute that fact. 
8 .  The explanation for the meaning of split-antecedent constructions parallels 
actually an argument by von von Stechow ( 1 984) . He has a very similar method for 
deriving the meaning for multi-head comparatives. 
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